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Abstract—The effects of closure decisions for used nuclear facilities can extend centuries into the future. Yet, the longevity 
of decisions made over the past half century has been poor.  Our goal is an improved decision framework for 
decommissioning, stewardship, and waste management.  This paper describes our overall framework.  Companion papers 
describe the underlying philosophy of the KONVERGENCE Model for Sustainable Decisions1 and implications for a class 
of intractable decision problems.2  Where knowledge, values, and resources converge (the K, V, and R in KONVERGENCE), 
you will find a sustainable decision – a decision that works over time.  Our approach clarifies what is needed to make and 
keep decisions over relevant time periods.  The process guides participants through establishing the real problem, 
understanding the universes of knowledge, values, resources, and generating alternatives.  We explore three classes of 
alternatives – reusable (e.g. greenfield), closed (e.g. entombed structures), and adaptable.  After testing for konvergence of 
alternatives among knowledge, values, resources, we offer suggestions to diagnose divergence, to reduce divergence by 
refining alternatives to address identified weaknesses, and to plan to keep konvergence over the life of the decision.  We 
believe that decisions made via this method will better stand the test of time – because it will be either acceptable to keep 
them unchanged or possible to adapt them as knowledge, values, and resources change.
I. INTRODUCTION 
The effects of closure decisions for used nuclear 
facilities and contaminated sites can extend centuries into 
the future. Yet, the longevity of decisions made over the 
past half century has been poor.  Our goal is an improved 
participatory science-based decision framework for 
decommissioning-stewardship-waste management 
decisions.  Here, “science” includes decision science, 
action science, sociology, psychology, political science, 
ethics, history, “hard” sciences, and many engineering 
disciplines.  We want to make decisions more robust, 
transparent, and consistent by more effective stakeholder 
involvement, greater understanding of the consequences 
of the decisions, and recognition of what it will take to 
keep decisions once they are made. 
This paper describes our framework, developed 
during the first half of a 3-year project.  We offer these 
ideas to solicit feedback and continue progress.  After 
reading this paper, we invite you to read our companion 
model and implications papers.1,2  A draft guidebook is 
available from the lead author.  In the second half of our 
project, we will further test the framework and further 
develop quantitative analysis tools.  This is a research 
project and does not represent official positions of the 
Department of Energy or its contractors. 
The classic siting approach is “decide-once” – single 
problem, fixed criteria, alternatives, then make a single 
decision to build or don’t build.  The “no action” 
alternative may be viable in such instances – do not build 
the hazardous facility.  Unsiting of used nuclear facilities 
and sites poses different challenges, motivating changes 
to decision processes.  The “no action” alternative is often 
untenable – the hazard is already there - and a “decide 
once” process can be unrealistic and costly. 
The inadequacy of current approaches has been 
summarized:  “Because uncertainty is inherent in many of 
these areas, and because DOE’s preferred solutions – 
reliance on engineered barriers and institutional controls – 
are inherently failure prone, step-wise planning for DOE 
legacy sites must be systematic, integrative,
comprehensive, and iterative in its execution through 
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time, adaptive in the face of uncertainty, and active in the 
search for new and different solutions.  Planning for long-
term institutional management should commence while 
remediation is underway.”3
II. KONVERGENCE MODEL 
Our framework is based on the need to establish and 
maintain konvergence among the three universes of 
accessible knowledge, values of those potentially 
affected, and available resources.  Each universe is 
represented by a circle in figure 1.  We call this the 
KONVERGENCE Model for Sustainable Decisions.1
Investigation of available data or to obtain new data 
defines knowledge.  Participation of stakeholders 
specifies values.  The availability of budgets, offsite 
disposal sites, environmental permits, etc. drives 
resources.  Acceptable alternatives are those in the 
konvergence of knowledge, values, and resources.  The 
KONVERGENCE Model clarifies what can go wrong and 
why certain analyses need to be done. 
Figure 1.  KONVERGENCE Model for Sustainable 
Decisions1
III. ESTABLISH WHAT THE REAL PROBLEM IS 
As in existing approaches, analyze the situation and 
identify the problem(s) to be solved.  Many difficulties 
stem from a bad start and so we suggest enhancements: 
x Analyze how decisions are related in time, space, 
functional, etc.  Identify related decisions, rather than 
making simplifying assumptions that can artificially 
decouple related decisions. 
x Analyze the appropriate decision level, e.g., should 
related decisions be considered together such as all 
cleanup decisions at a National Lab?  If the decision 
level is too broad or high, the decision process can 
stall due to complexity.  If the decision level is too 
narrow or low (such as focusing on one contaminated 
building ignoring surrounding hazards), decisions can 
be locally optimal but not optimal from a broader 
perspective, such as cases where there is a high 
degree of cleanup in a relatively dirty area. 
x Decrease the odds of disruption by late-entry players4
by actively inviting participation and probing their 
values.  This reduces the chances of having late-entry 
players and that any late-entry players that do arise 
are viewed as “saviors” rather than as “disruptors.” 
x Consider the decision environment4
o Collaborative – participants trust the decision 
process and each other 
o Negotiable – participants may trust the decision 
process, but not necessarily each other 
o Polarized – those affected by the decision trust 
neither the decision process nor each other 
In our approach, the decision environment influences 
how to implement the decision process. 
IV. DISCOVER THE VALUES OF THOSE 
AFFECTED BY THE DECISION 
Rather than jump to detailed objectives, e.g., cleanup 
a site to some risk limit, we start with broad values to 
maximize the chance for establishing a common ground 
and increasing collaboration, then work downward to 
principles, strategic objectives, tactical goals, and 
performance measures.  Table 1 shows our generic 
hierarchy of 4 values and 20 principles (Table 1) - 
assembled from the literature, our analyses of decision 
difficulties, and test cases.  They span process and result 
concerns.  Users must decide what to add, change, or 
delete from our generic set.  With the validated problem 
statement, these define what would constitute success. 
Table I includes two Precautionary Principles.
They advocate caution in differing ways.  The first 
cautions against taking actions prematurely if the actions 
pose threat of irreversible harm.  The second cautions 
against not taking action to protect against the threat of 
irreversible harm.  Some cleanup problems can 
encompass risk of both types.  Consider the case of a 
long-lived hazard that if left alone will eventually 
degrade, increase in risk, and become more difficult to 
cleanup.  Precautionary Principle 2 would argue to take 
cost-effective measures now!  But, which measures?”
Precautionary Principle 1 would argue against taking an 
irreversible action that might not be wise from the long-
term view.  In such situations, how can we proceed? No 
action is dangerous; taking a wrong action is dangerous.2
Below, we discuss the “adaptable” class of alternatives. 
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Table I.  Generic Values and Principles Relevant to Cleanup Decisions 
Equality – the decisions are fair and just for current and future generations 
x Trustee Principle – “Every generation has obligations as trustee to protect the interests of future generations.” 5
x Sustainability Principle – “No generation should deprive future generations of the opportunity for a quality of life 
comparable to its own.”5
x Chain of Obligation Principle – “Each generations’ primary obligation is to provide for the needs of the living and 
succeeding generations.” 5
x Precautionary Principle 1– “Actions that pose a realistic threat of irreversible harm or catastrophic consequences should 
not be pursued unless there is some compelling countervailing need to benefit either current or future generations.” 5
x Precautionary Principle 2 – “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, scientific uncertainty shall not be 
used to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”6
Democracy – the decision-making process is open with participation by all 
x Involvement Principle – The process should incorporate meaningful community and stakeholder involvement in all 
phases of decision-making now and in the future. 
x Information Principle – Complete, accurate, and useable information should be provided to both current and future 
peoples.
x Invisible Man Principle – The decision, the decision process, and supporting information must be transparent and 
understandable by interested parties now and in the future. 
x Poisoning of the Well Principle – Don’t poison the “well” for current and future decisions.  The decision process should 
make future decisions involving related problems and key stakeholders easier not harder by improving the decision 
environment.
x Tip of the Iceberg Principle – Without granting veto power to individual participants, concerns must be noted, 
addressed to the extent possible, and the risk of proceeding in the face of strong concerns considered before proceeding. 
Truth – the decision should reflect the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth  
x Uncertainty Principle – There will be large uncertainties in the knowledge about the hazards, the facility and its environs 
especially their future behavior and performance.  These uncertainties need to be acknowledged, documented and 
communicated with all involved. 
x Faber College Principle – “Knowledge is good.”  To be able to make a sound decision, knowledge about the 
contaminated situation is essential.  Research will be pursued if complete understanding is not possible.  [The name of this 
principle is our most obscure, from the movie Animal House.]
x Forest and the Trees Principle  – Understand the characteristics and context of the land and facilities near the site or 
facility in question.  Actions that might make sense in one location may not make sense in another.
x Price is Right or Fram Oil Filter Principle – The stakeholders have a need and a right to know not only what the 
cleanup activity will cost but what the life cycle costs will be.  [From the Fram Oil Filter slogan, “Pay me now or pay me 
later.”]
Reason – the decision should be real, practical, and meaningful 
x What if You are Wrong Principle – Decisions must withstand the test of time amid great uncertainty. 
x Paul Masson Principle – No decision should be made before its time.  [From their slogan, “Sell no wine before its 
time.”]
x Perry Mason Principle – Decisions must comply with the intent of environmental regulations regardless of current 
language or interpretation, e.g., protective of human health and the environment. 
x Hippocratic Worker Principle – Above all else, do no harm to the current worker especially when considering minimal 
hypothetical future risks. 
x Little Engine that Could Principle – The decision should lead to actions that are achievable, not necessarily easy, but 
doable with existing resources.
x Snicker Principle – The decision should be able to pass a snicker test by participants before implementation.
We believe that most decision difficulties arise from 
being perceived as violating one or more of these 
principles.  For example, a common complaint is the lack 
of adherence to what we call the Uncertainty Principle.
We discourage prioritizing among values, principles, 
etc. at this point, especially if the decision environment is 
polarized.  Maximize the chance for collaboration. 
V. GENERATE ALTERNATIVES 
When identifying alternatives, establish the nature of 
hazards, degree of adaptability, responsibilities of those 
who would help implement, and relationships among 
decisions.  Alternatives span ranges of adaptability and 
levels of residual on-site hazards (figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Hazard-Adaptability Space for alternatives 
Three general areas of adaptability-hazard option 
space are as follows: 
x Reusable - Relatively low hazard, variable 
adaptability - Facility can be released for other 
purposes, by other groups – with or without 
restrictions on use.  If “any” use of the facility/land 
would lead to acceptable risk, the release is 
“unrestricted”, e.g., greenfield.  If some users would 
pose unacceptable risks, the release is “restricted”, 
e.g., brownfield sites. 
x Adaptable - Relatively high hazard, relatively high 
adaptability - Facility is kept in an adaptable state, 
thereby keeping future options open while keeping the 
risk from hazards acceptable to stakeholders for an 
extended period.  Four examples are the concept of 
“assured storage” of low-level radioactive waste,7 the 
C reactor at Hanford, temporary spent fuel storage at 
commercial power plants, and the suggestion for 
adaptive staged decisions at Yucca Mountain.8
x Closed - Relatively high hazard, relatively low 
adaptability - Facility is put into state with little 
adaptability, with little or no intention to revisit later 
unless severe unexpected things go wrong.  So-called 
“entombed” facilities would be examples.  Another is 
deep geological disposal after site closure.
Participants should brainstorm as creatively as 
possible, including the “no action” and greenfield 
alternatives.  Often, the “no action” alternative will not be 
viable, but analysis of this alternative is required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) - if 
applicable to the decision in question.  Also, the relative 
unattractiveness of “no action” provides motivation for 
the decision processes not to stall.  The greenfield 
alternative is sometimes not viable, but should be studied 
because late entry participants and future generations will 
ask – why didn’t you just clean it totally? 
The adaptable class of alternatives is especially 
relevant to consider if there is a chance of polarization 
between those who advocate reusable and closed 
positions.2 A true adaptable alternative provides for 
safely containing the hazard, while working to increase 
the chance for konvergence of additional alternatives in 
the future. 
Once participants generate a diverse list of 
alternatives, it is important to ensure that the description 
of alternatives are sufficiently complete to meaningfully 
evaluate and to identify key assumptions.  The description 
must include the possible need for offsite waste 
disposition and any treatment of the hazards.  This will 
generally increase the number of alternatives and variants.  
After considering offsite disposition and treatment 
possibilities, re-examine the list of people invited to 
participate.  What might have been a decision with mostly 
local ramifications from unsiting a hazard may now have 
offsite ramifications. 
The last part of generating alternatives is to get an 
anonymous initial assessment of how participants 
evaluate the alternatives with respect to knowledge,
values, and resources.  Participants are asked to plot 
points (if certain) or circles/shapes (if uncertain) on the 
konvergence diagram (figure 1).  This gives an initial 
assessment of the degree of scatter and divergence.  
Scatter is the variance among participants for each 
alternative.  Divergence is how far alternatives may be 
from konvergence. 
VI. IDENTIFY AND REDUCE DIVERGENCE 
Quantitative analyses are often expensive.  
Prematurely conducting detailed quantitative analyses can 
also give the impression that the decision owner has 
already selected among alternatives.  Thus, it is 
appropriate to extract as much qualitative information as 
possible on participants’ reactions to alternatives before 
proceeding to detailed analyses. 
The objective is to create alternatives with low scatter 
and low divergence that are in konvergence of knowledge,
values, and resources.  We need to diagnosis what is 
causing scatter and divergence, as a prelude to narrowing 
the list, and refining alternatives.  It is impossible to refine 
alternatives if we do not know why participants evaluate 
alternatives as they do. 
Low scatter does not mean that people evaluate an 
alternative in exactly the same way – or are making the 
same key assumptions.  Participants need not agree on the 
relative merits of many of the alternatives. However, 
having worked through values, principles, and objectives 
and developed a range of alternatives, there should be 
sufficient common ground to allow fruitful discussion. 
We hypothesize that the scatter of values evaluations 
may correlate with the decision environment.  In a 
collaborative setting, participants have or are developing 
some sense of a shared set of values and should exhibit 
Reusable 
alternatives
Adaptable 
alternatives 
Closed 
alternatives 
Hazard severity and longevity (not risk)
A
da
pt
ab
ili
ty
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less scatter in values evaluations.  In a polarized setting, 
distrust may have increased scatter not only in values
evaluations but also knowledge and resources.
Ask participants the following: 
x Where does each alternative fit into knowledge,
resources, and values – and why? 
x What key assumptions are they making in that 
evaluation?  (Later, gather more information to 
replace assumptions with knowledge to reduce 
uncertainties in evaluations.) 
x What might change their evaluation, i.e., what 
weaknesses might be fixable? 
In section V, the first test of konvergence was a 
scatter diagram.  At this point, ask participants to give 
each alternative a score of 1 – 4 for each universe based 
on the definitions in Table II.  Participants should note 
whether they are (a) highly certain, (b) somewhat 
uncertain, or (c) highly uncertain in each evaluation.  
Thus, a score of K-1a, V-1a, R-1a indicates the 
alternative, in the opinion of the evaluator, is well within 
the knowledge, values and resources universes and the 
evaluator is highly certain of those ratings.  We also ask 
participants to provide a brief text rationale for their 
evaluations, which are then analyzed. 
Probe deeper into the causes of scatter if 
x the decision environment is polarized,  
x there is high scatter in values evaluations, or 
x distrust has affected evaluations of knowledge and 
resources.
If so, the discipline of “action science” is valuable.  Space 
does not permit much discussion of the concepts or their 
application to decision making.  To illustrate, note that we 
use mental models that reflect our world views.  These 
can have significant impacts on decisions (Table III). 
Circumstances that necessitate establishing an 
explicit networks of decisions at this point include:2
x Key relations among decisions, e.g., opening an 
offsite disposal site, 
x Assumptions that cannot be validated now, or 
x Adaptable alternatives. 
Refine alternatives using the understanding gained in 
diagnostic analyses to improve alternatives.  Alternatives 
that have inherent advantages but have weaknesses in 
some universes may warrant further attention to improve 
them.  For example, Shrader-Frechette points out that 
some conflicts between inter- and intragenerational ethics 
can be reduced by refining alternatives to consider both 
perspectives.9  Another example, if an alternative 
converges with knowledge but not values because of a 
lack of trust – perhaps reshape the alternative to include 
trust funds or stakeholder controlled mechanisms.
The final questions at this step are – (a) have we fixed 
alternatives’ weaknesses by reshaping them?  Those 
moving into or toward konvergence are retained; those 
remaining highly divergent are discarded and (b) is there  
an adequate diversity of alternatives still on the table?  If 
so, continue to quantitative analyses.  If not, generation of 
more alternatives or additional refinements to existing 
alternatives are needed. 
Table II.  KONVERGENCE Mapping Scales 
Location in Each 
Universe 
Knowledge of the solution Values and Principles Resources 
(1) In the center of 
each universe 
Validated – unquestioned 
(trusted) information and 
interpretation thereof 
Enthusiastic – very consistent 
with participant’s values, they 
would be advocates 
Committed – already 
available (“in hand”), e.g., 
trust funds, authorized 
budgets, operational waste 
disposal sites, existing 
workforce 
(2) Tends to be 
inside universe 
Tentative – significant evidence 
exists but questions persist on 
validity 
Acceptable – on balance, 
consistent with the set of the 
participant’s values but some 
aspects might be a bit 
troubling 
Proposed, e.g., out-year 
proposed budgets, planned 
waste sites 
(3) At the edge of 
each universe 
Speculative – probably 
achievable given R&D 
investment or if trust in the source 
of knowledge increases 
Tolerable – participant can 
“live” with the alternative but 
some aspects are clearly 
troubling 
Speculative - could be 
made available, e.g., society 
likely has the resources but 
has not moved to use them. 
(4) Clearly outside 
the universe 
Impractical  - the knowledge is 
unlikely to be obtainable in a time 
frame relevant to the problem
Oppose – on balance, 
inconsistent with participant’s 
values
Impractical – necessary 
resources are unlikely to be 
available
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Table III. Possible Mental Models Affecting Progress on a Decision 
Universe Mental model Possible result 
Knowledge My knowledge is certain, yours isn’t. High scatter in knowledge evaluation. 
 I cannot trust knowledge from “that” group,  
 Need to pool what we know Modest scatter in knowledge evaluation. 
Values I do not respect the values from “that” group. High scatter in values evaluation. 
 We share significant values in common, e.g., the 
need to avoid stalemate so that corrective action 
becomes possible. 
Search for common values, decrease in values scatter. 
 If you win, I lose. Polarized decision environment, high scatter in values
evaluation likely stalemate 
 A win-win is possible. Search for win-win alternatives, actively engage in 
trying to adjust or refine alternatives to make them 
acceptable to broader range of participants, shared 
values result and values scatter decreases. 
 I don’t trust them. Withhold information; do not admit that “their” 
alternatives might be fixable. 
 I might be able to trust them. Cautiously share information, consider that “their” 
alternatives might have some merit. 
Resource Allocated resources are “cast in concrete” Excessively pessimistic resources evaluation, high 
scatter in the resource evaluations. 
 Endless pockets – more resources are always 
possible if I apply enough pressure. 
Excessively optimistic resources evaluation, high 
scatter in the resource evaluations. 
 Use of resources is limited, but the limits are not 
always clear.  Find the most effective way to use 
resources among alternatives. 
Balanced resources evaluations, modest resources
evaluation scatter. 
VII. ANALYZE REMAINING ALTERNATIVES 
Detailed analyses, such as detailed engineering, cost 
estimates, and risk assessment, are expensive and time 
consuming.  Only the most promising alternatives should 
be carried to this step.  Most decisions do not fail because 
detailed analyses were inadequate.  They may fail if the 
wrong alternatives were analyzed or some analyses were 
not done, e.g., not looking at longer-term costs, risk, and 
adaptability penalties from the initial decision. 
Thus, part of our project is to extend the usefulness of 
two existing INEEL tools, the Environment, Safety, and 
Health Risk Analysis Program (ESHRAP)10 for risk 
estimates and the Deactivation and Decommissioning 
(D&D) Life Cycle Map Model11 for cost estimates.
The ESHRAP code allows two types of quantitative 
risk analyses – risk from performing environmental 
management activities and risks from wastes/materials.  
Risks to both workers and the public are calculated.  Any 
type of contaminated facility or site can be considered. 
“Activities considered include storage, retrieval, 
characterization, packaging, various treatment processes 
(both in-situ and ex-situ), loading/unloading, 
transportation (onsite and offsite), disposal, 
decommissioning, and long-term stewardship 
activities.”10  The risk estimates include radiological and 
chemical exposure and standard industrial accidents.  Risk 
to the public includes groundwater contamination, 
atmospheric dispersion, and various types of intrusion 
scenarios.  This project is adding risk during 
decommissioning activities. 
The goal of the D&D Life Cycle Map Model11 is to 
provide an economical means to develop rough order of 
magnitude cost and waste volume projections.  It is 
limited to decommissioning of contaminated facilities, 
whether the contamination is radiological or chemical, 
e.g., asbestos.  Surveillance and maintenance costs 
escalate while waiting for dismantlement.  The existing 
model only addresses one of the re-usable alternatives, 
full dismantlement.  We have started to explore the cost 
of closed and adaptable alternatives relative to full 
dismantlement.  Closure with hazards remaining in place 
(e.g. entombment) can cost from 7% to 50% of 
dismantlement based on our analysis of information in the 
following references. 
x Piqua Nuclear Power Facility (50%)12
x Hanford Production Reactors (37%)13
x INEEL Waste Calcine Facility (7.7%)14
x INEEL Fuel Process Building (7.5%)15
We believe that there are two major factors 
controlling the ratio of dismantlement to entombment 
costs – complexity/type and condition.  The more 
complex the facility, the more difficult to dismantle 
because of difficulty of sending workers inside to further 
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decontaminate the facility.  This raises the cost of 
dismantlement relative to filling with closure in place.  
The worse the condition of the facility, similarly the more 
difficult to dismantle; workers may even have to partially 
upgrade the facility, restore electrical services, etc. to 
safely clean it.  Thus, letting the facility degrade while 
waiting to do something to it increases the financial 
motivation to select a closed alternative. 
Putting the facility into long-term storage (“safe 
store”) while maintaining adaptability costs only a few 
percent of full dismantlement costs. 
x Hanford Production Reactors (3.1%)13
x INEEL Fuel Process Building (2.4%)15
Of course, there is some future cost to dismantle or 
close it.  Our analysis of the data for the Hanford 
Production Reactors13 suggests that the future deferred 
dismantlement cost in constant dollars would be about 
94% of upfront dismantlement.  There is some cost 
reduction because of putting it into safe store first. 
We have also examined annual surveillance and 
maintenance (S&M) costs before and after 
decommissioning (Table IV).  In the case of 
dismantlement, post-decommissioning S&M costs are 
zero.  For closed and adaptable alternatives, however, 
post-decommissioning S&M costs must be factored into 
the decision. 
Table IV.  Illustrative Estimates of Annual S&M Costs 
Relative to Full Dismantlement 
Before 
decommissioning 
After 
decommissioning 
Hanford 
Production 
Reactors13
0.70%/yr Adaptable: 0.14%/yr 
Entombment: 0.41%/yr 
INEEL Fuel 
Processing 
Building15
2.1%/yr Adaptable: 0.3%/yr 
We observe decision-makers struggling with the 
timeliness in making a decision or between stages of an 
adaptable alternative.  Which problem is more urgent than 
the next?  Attacking the highest risk first is one factor, but 
sometimes an initially lower risk, left unattended, can 
escalate unacceptably or lead to net higher costs. 
Traditionally, risk is expressed as consequence times 
frequency.  Consider for present purposes, risk (R) as 
hazard (H) divided by containment barrier effectiveness 
(B), R = H/B.  Many hazards degrade with time, thereby 
decreasing risk without any other action being taken. 
Containment barriers also degrade with time, increasing 
risk of barrier failure, the risk of worker accidents during 
deferred decommissioning, the cost of surveillance and 
maintenance, and the cost of deferred decommissioning.  
In general, if the hazard is degrading slowly and the 
barrier is degrading quickly (or already seriously 
degraded), the risk is increasing and action is urgent.  In 
contrast, if the hazards are decaying quickly (e.g.. short-
lived radioactive isotopes) and the barrier is degrading 
slowly, risk is decreasing naturally and action is 
sometimes less urgent.  In future work we will further 
explore such tradeoffs. 
We note that sometimes people affected by a decision 
cannot agree on the absolute risk posed by an existing 
hazardous site.  In such cases it may still be possible to 
agree on what conditions and actions lead to relative risk 
reduction. 
We stress that risk and cost are only two of the 
factors necessary to make a sustainable decision, many 
other ones – for example values – are difficult or 
impossible to meaningfully quantify.  We recognize that 
there is a tendency to focus decisions primarily on those 
factors that are quantifiable.  In our daily lives, however, 
we include non-quantifiable factors in decisions.  For 
example, do any of us only consider cost and risk in 
selecting our next automobile?  Our framework is 
intended to preserve balance between quantifiable and 
qualitative factors. 
VIII. PLAN TO MAINTAIN KONVERGENCE 
Management of konvergence is required over the 
lifetime of any remaining hazard.  Understanding how 
knowledge, values, and resources are changing with time 
is required to keep konvergence – the situation should be 
managed so that either changes to decisions can be 
avoided or done in a controlled manner.  There are only 
two strategies that are sustainable if the residual hazard 
will persist for long (decades and beyond) time periods.  
First, one can monitor the entire konvergence and change 
the implemented solution as necessary to keep the 
solution in konvergence.  Second, one can attempt to 
actively manage parts of the three universes to increase 
the chance that the implemented solution remains in 
konvergence. 
A limited version of the first strategy is required in 
many environmental laws.  For example, decisions under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) have 5-year 
reviews. However, the tendency is only to monitor 
changes in the knowledge universe, e.g., monitoring 
groundwater to detect containment barrier failure (after 
the failure has occurred!).  We suggest creating a 
complete Early Warning System – monitoring changes in 
knowledge, values, and resources so that trends that 
might require a change to a decision are caught early 
enough that it is practical to make such a change. 
The second strategy of managing the three universes 
also has limits.  One cannot predetermine changes in 
knowledge, but it is possible and appropriate in some 
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circumstances to have an R&D program to attempt to 
increase knowledge, which can reduce uncertainties.  
Managing values other than your own is problematical.  
However, one can attempt to earn increased trust by how 
the decision is implemented and maintained.  Local 
communities cannot always force state and federal 
officials to supply resources, but trust funds can be 
established to reduce uncertainties and fluctuations in 
some of the resource universe – as is required by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning 
funds for commercial power plans. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
Decisions are sometimes made without considering 
the need to keep decisions acceptable over extended 
periods of time.  Keeping decisions acceptable requires 
maintaining konvergence of knowledge, values, and 
resources – the KONVERGENCE Model for 
Sustainable Decisions.
Since we do not know how to make perfect decisions, 
we focus on how to make better ones. “Better” decisions 
means those that are coherent with available knowledge at 
the time, consistent with values of those potentially 
affected by the decision, and made in accordance with 
available resources. We believe that such decisions will 
better stand the test of time – because it will be either (a) 
acceptable to keep them unchanged or (b) possible to 
adapt them as knowledge, values, and resources change. 
Our framework may also provide an easier way to 
make decisions for problems that have proven to be 
difficult.2  The resistance comes from one or more 
stakeholders (including regulators) because they either do 
not trust the person making the decision or view the 
consequences of being wrong as too high.  In such cases, 
we must either reduce the consequences of being wrong 
(e.g. by implementing adaptable alternatives that can be 
changed later if need be) and/or by splitting a single 
decision into a network of decisions (e.g. earning trust).
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